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PE 143.073/fin. 
By letter of 6 June 1990 the Council consulted the European Parliament, 
pursuant to Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, on the Commission proposal for a 
Council decision on the conclusion of the Articles of Agreement establishing a 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
At the sitting of 11 June 1990 the President of Parliament announced that he 
had referred this proposal to the Committee on External Economic Relations as 
the committee responsible and to the Political Affairs Committee, the 
Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy and the Committee on Budgetary Control for their opinions. 
At its meeting of 17 July 1990 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
appointed Mr Marck rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 17 September 1990 it considered the Commission proposal and 
draft report. 
At the latter meeting the committee decided unanimously to recommend that 
Parliament approve the Commission proposal for a Council decision on the 
conclusion of the Articles of Agreement establishing a· European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
The committee then adopted the draft legislative resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Marck, rapporteur; 
Aglietta, Da Cunha Oliveira (for Bettiza), Isquierdo Rojo (for Cano Pinto), 
Porto, Sainjon and Titley. 
The opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy is attached. The opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the 
Committee on Budgetary Control will be published separately. 
The report was tabled on 28 September 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report wi 11 appear in the draft 
agenda for the part-session at which it is to be considered. 
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A 
DRAFT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the 
Commission to the Council for a decision on the conclusion of the Articles of 
Agreement establishing a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(COM(90} 190 final} 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposal from the Commission to the Council 
(COM(90} 190 final} 1 , 
- having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 235 and under the 
procedure laid down in Article 228 of the EEC Treaty (Doe. C 3-143/90}, 
- having regard to its resolution of 5 April 1990 on the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development2 , 
- having regard to the report by the Committee on External Economic Relations 
and the opinions of the Political Affairs Committee, the Committee on 
Budgets, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy and the Committee on Budgetary Control (Doe. A 3-236/90}, 
1. Approves the cone 1 us ion and entry into force in i nternat ion a 1 1 aw and 
practice of the Articles of Agreement establishing a European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development; 
2. Instructs its President to forward this opinion to the Council, the 
European Investment Bank, the Comm1 ss ion and the governments of the 
Member States and the other contracting parties. 
1 OJ No. C 
2 OJ No. C 113, 7.5.1990, p. 172 
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B 
fXfLAN~TORY STATEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Central and Eastern Europe are at a turning point in history. Their peoples, 
after succeeding in liberating themselves from Stalinist totalitarian regimes, 
now have to make the transition to democratic structures, constitutionality, 
multi -party systems and the market economy. The burden of the processes of 
adjustment will have to be borne principally by the local population itself, 
but the countries of the western world have to help the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe in theil" task, not simply out of solidarity but also in 
their perceived own interest. 
The European Community, as the direct neighbour of Central and Eastern Europe, 
has a particular responsibility in this respect, which it has shouldered 
hitherto in the conclusion of trade and cooperation agreements opening the 
Community's markets to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
provision of funds from the Community budget and loans by the EIB under the 
PHARE programme of 24 western industrialized countries which the Commission is 
coordinating. 
Economically, the main problems lie in the legacy of over 40 years of 
inefficient centrally planned economies. Completely obsolete plants, poor 
infrastructure, production arrangements insufficiently attuned to consumer 
needs, lack of experience with private sector management methods and lack of 
motivation are only some of them. A solution to these problems therefore 
seemed to lie in the provision of western capital to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe to modernize their industries and production-related 
infrastructures along the lines of the Marshall Plan. 
The idea of creating a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was 
first put forward by President Mitterand when addressing the European 
Parliament on 25 October 1989 as President-in-Office of the European Council. 
The proposal was discussed at the informal Paris Summit held in November 1989 
and endorsed by the European Council of 8 and 9 December in Strasbourg. The 
bank's purpose would be to promote productive and competitive investment in 
the Central and Eastern European countries, to facilitate the transition 
towards a market-based economy and to accelerate the required structural 
adjustments. The Bank's main task would be to develop the competitive 
productive sector. The European Council called for negotiations to open in 
January 1990. 
II. COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The first conference of the founder countries called by the French Government 
took place in Paris on 15 January 1990. In addition to the 24 western 
industrialized countries and the recipient countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, other European and non- European countries expressed an interest in 
participation in the BERD. The European Council had also called upon the 
Community as such, represented by the Commission, and the EIB, to take part in 
the conference as future shareholders. The final number of participants was 
42 countries. 
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Subsequent meetings on the basis of a draft statute for the BERD submitted by 
France were held in February and March 1990. Their purpose was to determine 
the size of the Bank's original capital stock, the shares to be held by the 
participant countries and the Bank's terms of reference, and to discuss the 
participation of the USSR as a shareholder and recipient state. The 
negotiations had largely been concluded on 9 April; the only outstanding 
question was the location of the principal office of the bank. On 29 May, 
when the agreement was signed, it was decided that this should be London. 
In a. resolution adopted on 5 April 1990 the European Parliament welcomed the 
establishment of the BERD as an important step in support of the process 
embarked on by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe of determining 
their own economic future. It also welcomed the participation of the USSR in 
the Bank and the fact that loans would be granted for the development of the 
USSR. It advocated that, in determining the criteria for allocating funds, 
account should be taken not only of private investment but also public 
infrastructure which should be given priority in the form of additional funds. 
Specific attention should also be paid to effective monitoring of the projects 
funded and the capacity of the economies of the recipient countries to absorb 
the investment. 
Ill. CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT 
The agreement lays down the purpose, operation, conditions for participation 
and granting of loans, the amount of capital stock, the use of the ECU, 
participation by the Community and the organs of the BERD in detail. 
Article 1 states that the purpose of the bank is to foster the transition 
towards market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneuri a 1 
initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries committed to and 
applying the principles of multi-party democracy, pluralism and market 
economics. 
Substantial funds are required for this transition. The BERD, according to 
Article 2, is to assist, via the granting of loans and participation in 
private and public sector enterprises, where they operate in market-oriented 
fashion or are to be privatized, in obtaining the necessary funds. 
Infrastructure projects necessary for private sector development may also be 
granted aid up to a maximum of 40% of the funds committed (Article 11}. 
Article 3 states that membership shall be open to European countries, to non-
European countries which are members of the International Monetary Fund, to 
the EIB and to the European Community. 
The recipient countries are all countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
proceeding towards market-oriented economies (Article 8}. During the first 
three years, lending to the USSR is to be restricted to the amount of capital 
paid in by the USSR (30% of 600m ECU}. After that, it will be for the Board 
of Governors to decide by a majority of three-quarters of the Governors 
representing at least 85% of the capital stock to decide on the future status 
of the USSR as a recipient country. 
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The bank has to distinguish between its ordinary and special lending 
operations (Article 9). Ordinary operations have to be financed out of its 
subscribed capital, reserves and surpluses and are thus 1 imited to those 
amounts (Article 12). Article 13 lays down the bank's operating principles, 
which include the following: the bank shall apply sound banking principles, 
especially in respect of creditworthiness, it may not finance any undertaking 
in the territory of a member if that member objects, it shall keep resources 
allocated to recipient countries in proportion and may provide finance only 
where the investor is unable to obtain sufficient finance elsewhere. The Bank 
has to make its 1 oans on market terms (Article 14), except in the case of 
special funds administered by it on behalf of third parties. 
Article 4 sets the capital stock at 10 thousand million ECU, divided into 
paid-in shares and callable shares. Article 5 provides that 30% of the 
capital stock shall be paid in, 50% in cash and 50% in non-negotiable, non-
interest-bearing promissory notes. Payments shall be made in five equal 
annual instalments. Annex 1 shows the apportionment of the capital stock 
among the individual participant countries. This ensures that the Community, 
the EIB and the EEC Member States together hold a majority of 51% of the 
capital stock. The members of the Group of Seven (FRG, F, I, UK, USA, CAN, 
JAP) also have over 50% of the capital stock and hence of the votes. 
The bank's capital stock is expressed in ECU (Article 6). As about 75% of the 
capital stock will be he.ld by European countries, a correspondingly high 
proportion of payments in ECU is to be expected. The use of the ECU would, 
however, present budgetary difficulties for the USA as its President can 
request appropriations from Congress only in dollars. For that reason the US 
dollar and the yen are also permissible denominations for paying in to the 
capital stock, on the basis of the average exchange rates for the period from 
30 September 1989 to 31 March 1990. 
Article 22 provides that the Bank shall have a Board of Governors, a Board of 
Directors, a President and one or more Vice-Presidents. The Board of 
Governors is the highest decision-taking body. Each member appoints one 
Governor. The Commission appoints the Community's Governor. The members of 
the 23-strong Board of Directors are elected by the Board of Governors. Under 
Article 26, the Community, the EIB, and the Member States of the Community 
have 11 directors and the Central and Eastern European countries 4, as will 
the other European countries and the non-European countries. 
The powers of the Board of Governors will include the admission of new 
members, increasing or decreasing the authorized capital stock, suspending 
members, the election of the President and Directors, the approval, after 
reviewing the Auditor's report, of the general balance sheet and the profit 
and loss account and determining the reserves and the allocation of the net 
profits of the bank. 
Under Article 27 the Board of Directors is responsible for the direction of 
the general operations of the bank, establishes policy on loans, guarantees 
and investments, takes decisions on the use of resources, submits the audited 
accounts for each year and approves the Bank's annual budget. 
The President, who is elected by a simple majority of the Board of Governors 
for a period of four years, conducts the current business of the bank under 
the direction of the Board of Governors (Article 30}. He is the legal 
representative of the bank and the chief of its staff. 
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A Frenchman, Jacques Attali, was elected first President of the bank. His 
election revealed differences of opinion between the four largest and the 
other Community countries. With the USA, Canada and Japan within the Group of 
Seven, they had already decided on Attali as President and thus ignored the 
candidacy of Onno Ruding, the former Dutch Minister of Financial Affairs. 
Belgium and the Netherlands in particular regarded this as an affront and it 
highlighted the need for future coordination within the Community to ensure 
the smooth running of the BERD. 
The principal office of the bank is in London (Article 33). It may also set 
up branches in all Member States. Until the end of the negotiations the seat 
was a bone of contention. The USA had initially favoured Prague. 
Article 62 states that the agreement will enter into force when it has been 
ratified by signatories whose subscriptions represent not less than two-thirds 
of the total capital stock. 
IV. THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL 
The purpose of this Commission proposal is to create the legal framework for 
the accession by the Community as such to the agreement establishing the BERD. 
For this a decision to that effect by the Council is required, after it has 
consulted the European Parliament pursuant to Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. 
Your rapporteur recommends that the Commission proposal be approved. The 
agreement meets the general requirements set forth by Parliament in its 
resolution of 5 April 1990. At its meeting of 17 July 1990 the Committee on 
External Economic Re-lations was also told by the appropriate member of the 
Commission, Vice-President Christophersen of the progress and outcome of the 
negotiations in which the Community was only one of 42 taking part. 
He pointed out that the USSR was not to be marginalized in the BERD. It had, 
however, had to agree to having its borrowing limited to the amount of its 
capital share. The 40% limit on production-related infrastructure projects 
was not too low in present circumstances. Financing the training of business 
managers was not one of the Bank's tasks. There were other programmes for 
this purpose (TEMPUS, European Foundation for vocational training). To ensure 
the most efficient allocation and use of funds the Bank would set up branches 
in all Central and Eastern European countries. 
V. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The financial implications of the establishment and operations of the BERD are 
not dealt with in the Commi ss 1 on proposa 1 . They are however of great 
importance to the EP's attitude and should therefore be outlined here. 
First of all the Community has to establish the budgetary basis for 
subscribing its share of the capital stock. Out of the 10 000 m ECU initial 
capital stock the Community has to contribute 3%, or 300 m ECU. 30% of this 
amount (90 m ECU) will be paid in five equal annual instalments of 18 m ECU 
DOC_EN\RR\95696 
- 8 - PE 143.073/fin. 
between 1991 and 1995. The appropriations will taken from the Community 
budget, Section Ill (Commission), Part B (Operating appropriations), Sub-
Section 7 (Cooperation with developing and third countries), Article 610. 
This will be compulsory expenditure. 
As a shareholder the Community will be responsible for losses incurred in the 
operations of the Bank only up to the amount of its share in the capital. The 
Community can therefore incur no further commitments apart from the callable 
part of its subscription (270 m ECU). As the Bank can call for it only when 
it is unable to meet its commitments otherwise, and as the amount and timing 
of any such call cannot be predicted, a separate token entry has been made for 
this item (Article 611). 
In technical budgetary terms this is of course appropriate, but your 
rapporteur would point out that this raises the potentia 1 li abi 1 i ty to the 
Community budget arising from aid to Central and Eastern Europe, when added to 
the existing 2000 m ECU (guarantees for EIB loans to Poland and Hungary under 
the PHARE programme and for a medium-term stand-by credit for Hungary, each of 
1000 m ECU) to a total of 2270 m ECU. These figures underline the urgent need 
for an overall view, as the European Parliament has repeatedly called for. 
The Commission has promised to produce this by October 1990. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The BERD, which will probably begin operations in spring 1991, is a 
further link in the rapidly developing relationship between the Community and 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Its task will be to help meet 
the enormous needs for capital for the restructuring and modernization of the 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. It should not be forgotten that most 
of the funds will have to come from private and 1 ocal sources. The 40%-60% 
breakdown (between the public and private sectors) reflects the philosophy of 
the BERD, which, according to a statement 1t issued recently, proposes to 
pursue a client-oriented policy. Both firms and government bodies will be 
clients. The BERD wishes to be a preferential partner for the private sector 
and wi 11 therefore act as a body that is part and parce 1 of the Eastern 
European private sector rather than simply a bystander. It is a moot point, 
however, whether the projected 40% limit will be sufficient to finance major 
infrastructure projects (roads, railways, telecommunications, etc.) 
coordinated cooperation with other multilateral organizations (the EIB and 
World Bank) would therefore appear unnecessary. 
2. Comparisons are often made between the BERD and the US-financed programme 
for the reconstruction of Europe, the Marshall plan. While illuminating, 
such comparisons also reveal major differences, which reside less in the 
sea 1 e than in the nature of the problems. Then, it was a question of 
restoring industries and infrastructures destroyed by the war, where 
considerable increases in productivity could be achieved by repairs without 
great capital investment, while today it is a question of converting and 
modernizing economies from top to bottom, which were cut off from the 
international division of labour for decades, and subject to the 
inefficiencies of central economic planning. 
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Nor should it be forgotten that the provision of capital is a necessary, but 
not the only, factor in the successful conversion of the economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The provision of the required technical and 
organizational knowledge, i.e. human ~apital, is also most important. This is 
frequently at least as problematic and time-consuming as physical capital 
resources, but is a task that will have to be handled chiefly by the 
Commission. 
3. The EP has also called for effective control over funds placed by the 
BERD. The pro~osa 1 by the Committee on Budgetary Control in this regard 
should be acted on. Since present checks on the 'EIB are unsatisfactory, and 
different arrangements must therefore be found for the BERD. The requisite 
guarantees must be obtained from the EIB and the European Community, since 
they are BERD partners. 
4. Why is it that the BERD cannot issue export credit guarantees? This is 
an approach that has proven successful 1 n a number of Member States. The 
fact that no international organization does so would not appear to be a 
satisfactory argument. 
5. The rapporteur believes that cooperation between the EIB and the BERD on 
a sound and permanent basis is extremely important: not only to prevent 
duplication of efforts, but also because the resources available must be put 
to the best possible use. In its capacity as an BERD partner, the EIB would 
have to take the necessary measures and keep the EP regularly informed on 
these co 11 aborat 1 ve arrangements. The European Community must therefore do 
everything in its power to promote tnterregional cooperation between the 
recipient countries. This could substantially enhance the effectiveness of 
the funds provided by the BERD. 
6. The association agreements being sought by the Community could provide 
the starting point. As well as strengthening cooperation between the 
individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the Community, they 
should therefore also be seeking to strengthen cooperation between those 
countries. Other possibilities might be membership of individual Central and 
Eastern European countries of EFTA and even the Community in the medium and 
longer term. Since the EIB will have to handle any financial-cooperation 
agreements between the European Community and the countries of Eastern Europe 
by financing 1 oans, effective coordination and cooperation between the BERD 
and the EIB would appear to be called for in this instance too. 
7. Your rapporteur would also refer, lastly, to the need for close 
coordination between the Member States of the Community in their activities 
within the BERD. We must ensure that in this as in other international bodies 
the Member States speak with one voice. If the 'big four' with the US, 
Canada and Japan are to play a dominating role this can only be detrimental to 
the Community in the long term. Incidents such as those which recently, and 
regrettably, occurred in connection with designating the seat and appointing 
the President of the BERD must be avoided at all costs. The Member States 
should therefore consider giving the Commission further powers of coordination 
in addition to its role as a shareholder. 
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LIST OF MEMBER STATES 
Initial subsc~iptions to the authorized capital stock ~o~ prospective(*) 
members ~hlch may become members in accordance vith Article 61 -
NUMBER CAPITAL 
Of SHARES SUBSCRIPTION 
in million ECU 
A - European Communities 
(a) 
(b) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany, Federal Republic of 
Gr-eece 
Ir-eland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portug~l 
Spaln 
United Kingdom 
European Economic community 
European Investment Bank 
B - Other European countries 
Austria 
Cyprus 
Finland 
Iceland 
Israel 
Liechtenstein 
Malta 
Norvay 
Sveden 
Svitzerland 
Turkey 
- 11 -
22800 
12000 
85175 
85175 
6500 
3000 
85175 
2000 
24800 
4200 
34000 
85175 
228.00 
120.00 
851.75 
851.75 
65.00 
30.00 
851.75 
20.00 
248.00 
42.00 
340.00 
851.75 
)0000 300.00 
JOOOO 300.00 
22800 
1000 
12500 
1000 
6500 
200 
lOO 
12500 
22800 
22800 
11500 
228.00 
10.00 
125.00 
10.00 
65.00 
2.00 
1. 00 
125.00 
228.00 
228.00 
115.00 
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C - Recipient· countries 
Bulgaria 7900 79.00 Czechoslovakia 12800 128.00 Gennan Democratic Republic 15500 155.00 
-- Hunya~ 7900 79.00 
Po an 12800 128.00 
Romania 4800 48.00 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .60000 600.00 
'fugoslavia 12800 128.00 
0 - Non-European countries 
Australia 10000 100.00 
Canada )4000 340.00 
Egypt: 1000 10.00 
.Japan 85175 851.00 
Korea, Republic.of 6500 65.00 
MeX:lCO )000 )0.00 
Morocco 1000 10.00 
Ne~ Zealand 1000 10.00 
United States of America 100000 1,000.00 
E - Non allocated shares 
125 l. 25 
TOTAL 1000000 10,000.00 
(*) Prospective members are listed under t:he above categories only 
for the pu~ose of this Agreement. Recipient countries are referred to 
else~here in this Agreement as Central and Eastern European countries 
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0 P I N I 0 N 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 
for the Committee on External Economic Relations 
Draftsman: Mr John STEVENS 
At its meeting of 11 June 1990 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy appointed Mr Stevens draftsman. 
At its meeting of 25, 26 and 27 September 1990 it considered the draft 
opinion. It adopted the conclusions thereof on 26 September 1990. 
The following took part in the vote: Beumer, chairman; Stevens, rapporteur; 
Peter Beazley, Bernard-Raymond, David (for Barton), Glinne (for Metten), 
Herman, Hoppenstedt, Porto (for de Donnea), Read, Siso Cruellas, Tongue and 
von Wogau. 
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I. SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (BERD) is 
to promote productive and competitive investments in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and, by so doing, to facilitate their transition to a 
market economy. Following approvaJ of this European initiative by the 
European Council in Strasbourg on 8 and 9 December 1989, a constituent 
Intergovernmental Conference was held on 15 January 1990. Negotiations were 
concluded on 9 April 1990, and forty countries as well as the EEC and the EIB 
have stated their intention to become members of the Bank. The instruments of 
ra ti fi cation of the agreement must be deposited at the latest by 
31 March 1991. 
2. Capital 
The Bank's capital has been set at 10 bn ECU, and is to be contributed in the 
following proportions: 75% from Europe as a whole, and the remainder from non-
European countries, mainly the USA (10%) and Japan (8.5%). Of the 75% 
contributed by Europe, 51% is to come from the EEC countries (including 3% 
contributed by the EEC in its own right and 3% by the EIB), 12% from the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and 12% from other European 
countries. Contributions will be made in ECUs, dollars, or yen. The amount 
of capital may be reviewed after five years. Thirty per cent of the initial 
capital of 10 bn ECU will be released over the first five years. 
3. Operations 
The Bank will be managed by a 42-member Board of Governors and a Board of 
Directors (23 in number, of whom 11 will be appointed by the Governors 
representing the EEC and 12 by the Governors representing the other member 
countries). The members of the two boards will have voting rights weighted in 
accordance with the amount of capital subscribed. 
The Bank will be called upon to grant or to guarantee loans and to make equity 
participations into private-sector enterprises, to state-owned enterprises 
being privatised and operating competitively and also for infrastructure. 
Only up to the 40% limit stated in Article 11 may be used to finance state-
owned enterprises. As a prudential limit equity investments and underwriting 
securities issued by any enterprise for purposes consistent with the purpose 
and functions of the Bank are limited to the level of capital paid in (30%). 
The Bank will also specialize 1n giving financial advice and assistance with 
privatization, mergers, acquisitions and the setting up of joint ventures, and 
will be able to grant loans based on funds provided by the financial market. 
The Soviet Union holds 6% of the capital but, during a three-year transitional 
period, will not be able to borrow more than 30% of its actual contribution on 
account of the sheer scale of its needs and the continuing uncertainty 
regarding its political and economic development. 
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• 
It is intended that the EIB should play a leading role in the Bank's 
transitional phase of operation between now and March 19913 • 
4. The role of the Community as such 
The Community's share will represent 3% of the Bank's total capital, Le. 
300 m ECU. Thirty per cent of this amount (i.e. 90 m ECU) will be released 
from 1991 onwards in five annual payments, each of 18 m ECU. 
The EEC Governor of the Bank and his Alternate will be designated by the 
Commission (Article 2) . 
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSAL 
It is difficult to give these proposals for the BERD a very enthusiastic 
welcome. As planned, the new institution is unlikely to make more than a 
minor contribution to solving the problems of Eastern Europe, and there is 
already some evidence that its genesis has distracted the attention of the 
Community and Member States, and indeed of international investors generally, 
from facing up to the rea 1 requirements of the economic deve 1 opment of the 
newly liberated parts of our continent. 
These may be summarised as follows: 
1. A complete overhaul of most of the infrastructure. 
2. Arresting and reversing environmental degradation. 
3. Creating a sound monetary system. 
4. Creating an effective system of business law. 
5. Granting the maximum access to the Community market to Eastern European 
products. 
6. Ensuring the most rapid possible privatisation of economic assets and the 
introduction of a free market in goods and services. 
It is generally recognized that objectives 1 and 2 will require large sums of 
public money at least in the initial stages, and it is difficult to see how 
the BERD's total proposed capital of 10 billion ECU, of which just 30% is to 
be paid in, can be regarded as adequate to even a small portion of the task. 
Rather than pretend in its wide terms of reference to have some role to play 
in this regard, the BERD might benefit from being restricted to the more 
specific Objective 5 of facilitating the emergence of an efficient private 
sector. 
However, it must be made clear that lending foreign exchange, without 
government guarantees, to private borrowers located in countries with 
unconvertible currencies, and severe restrictions on their ability to earn 
hard currency through competitive exports, is a prospect likely to make any 
3 By giving technical assistance (operational guidance; selection of 
consultants) and, possibly, financial assistance. This will be dealt with 
in an exchange of letters between the two institutions. 
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banker and his shareholders blanch. In other words, for the BERD to fly the 
Community must, as a matter of urgency, face the problem of opening its 
markets to Eastern European products. This will mean hard decisions, 
especially in the field of agriculture, but they cannot be evaded. It will 
also most likely accelerate the pace of Community monetary union, as only by 
this boost to the integration and efficiency of our economy will we be able to 
afford to be generous in granting both aid and market access to our Eastern 
brothers. 
On this latter point, it is unfortunate that the ECU does not have a 
privileged status as the denominating currency of the BERD' s 1 nvestments. 
Moreover, since its transactions in dollars and yen are to be calculated on 
the basis of the average exchange rate preva i1 i ng over the previous six 
months, this could leave the BERD with an open exchange risk. 
Even if the general pre-conditions of Objectives 3 and 4 are addressed, one 
can question if there is any real need for public funding for private sector 
development such as the BERD might promote. If a project is sound and likely 
to be profitable, private investment ought naturally to be available. If a 
project is not sound, it should not be undertaken in the first place. The 
disappointing record of economic aid programmes of every kind has not been 
reassuring for tax payers. Perhaps the BERD, while being too under-funded for 
infrastructure and environmental projects, will be too bureaucratic to foster 
entrepreneurial developments? 23 Directors for an institution with a turnover 
of only 2 billion ECU a year seems very top heavy. 
Unfortunately the private sector has shown a very great reluctance to really 
get involved in Eastern European investments. This is principally due to the 
following failures by Eastern European governments: 
1. To clarify property rights for foreign investors. 
2. To allow sufficient capacity to repatriate profits. 
3. To permit realistic manning levels in many joint ventures. 
But there have also been failures of imagination and enterprise by 
international investors, and there seems to be a pervasive and growing 
perception in financial circles that Eastern Europe will be another South 
America, the graveyard of ambitious bankers' balance sheets. 
The critical task which the BERD should be addressing is to use its particular 
status as a publicly-funded banking institution seeking for finance under 
commercial criteria an emergent private sector, to bridge this gap of 
understanding between Western private investors and the Eastern European 
governments. For this a capital of 10 billion ECU, if it is used largely in 
the form of risk-reducing guarantees for private investment by way of loans or 
equity participation in Eastern European ventures, rather than by investments 
on its own book, should be easily adequate, because of the pace of change in 
capital markets, in particular securitisation and derivative instruments. 
This would mean repealing the restriction against the BERD providing insurance 
services under Article 12.4 of the decision. 
There is no need now to re-draw the Commission proposa 1 s to give the BERD 
this specific focus. Getting the participating States through their governors 
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to set such a strategy for the President and the Directors should be 
sufficient. 
There is however a need for a good de a 1 more clarity with regard to the 
distribution of funding for aid programmes between the various recipient 
states, and how account can be taken of what may be very different speeds of 
development towards free market regimes in the various Eastern European 
states. There should also be a more coherent statement in the proposals as to 
how the BERD's activities will be coordinated with other aid programmes 
conducted by other i nst it uti ons. The Commission wi 11 have to take a 1 ead in 
forming an overall strategy for public funding of Eastern European projects, 
not least because some of these may involve state subsidies with implications 
for Community competition policy. It is not at all clear that with Community 
participation in the BERD capital of only 51% such a leadership role will be 
fully effective. 
We understand the reason for not making the BERD an exclusively European 
institution but we hope its present structure will not serve as a barrier to 
the eventual full membership in the Community of the ex-COMECON countries. If 
the Commission is to gain such a competence, this can only be with an 
obligation to consult the Parliament in its execution. For the purposes of 
the BERD, this procedure could be best secured by amending the Decision to 
grant us a right to summon the President to report to the relevant 
Parliamentary committees. 
As regards the organizational structure of the BERD, M. Attali is probably 
right to insist on a clear-cut decision making process. Without this, it will 
be difficult for the BERD to be credible in dealing with the private sector 
investors. On the other hand, it is not immediately apparent that, to be 
effective, it wi 11 need a costly branch network throughout Eastern Europe. 
Direct experience of the ex-COMECON infrastructure inadequacies could provide 
a powerful additional motivation for the BERD's staff. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The BERD should be approved by the Parliament on the following conditions: 
1. Its lending should be denominated exclusively in ECUs. 
2. 
3. 
It should give priority to the task to provide a 
between the West and private investors and 
authorities so that the appropriate context can 
enterprise to flourish in those countries. 
bridge of understanding 
the Eastern European 
be created for private 
Its funds should be provided wherever possible in the form of risk-
reducing guarantees to Western private sector investment in Eastern 
projects rather than own book investments, thus making the BERD' s role 
that of a catalyst to investment rather than a principal. The 
restriction against it providing insurance under Article 12.4 should be 
removed so that the Bank may be flexible in the face of further evolution 
of capital market practice. 
4. Its Board of Governors should clarify in a Memorandum to the Commission 
and the Parliament the operating principles of its lending policy to 
ensure balance of treatment between states in receipt of funds. 
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5. The BERD President should report on a regular basis to the Commission and 
the appropriate committees of the European Parliament as to the progress 
of its activities. 
6. The President and the Board of Directors should ensure the most 
streamlined possible administrative and decision making structure. 
7. The Commission and the Council should be reminded that the BERD is merely 
a small part of the response required to ensure the economic development 
of Eastern Europe, and urges them to give the highest priority to open 
the Community's markets to the products of Eastern European countries and 
to take such further measures for the integration of the Community's own 
economy so that we will have sufficient growth to provide the resources 
necessary for this great task. 
8. It is to be regretted that the participation of the EEC Member States in 
the capital and the administrative bodies of the BERD has been decided on 
without regard for Community procedures and Parliament's wishes. 
9. It is also to be regretted that the role of Community institutions such 
as the Commission and the EIB in the operation of the BERD is a marginal 
one and that the voting power of the smaller countries and of these 
institutions has been reduced to a minimum. 
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